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This dialogue reflects and synthesized the content of a 
recent publication (Einaudi, 2018) entitled Il denaro e i 
suoi inganni (by John R. Searle and Maurizio Ferraris, 
ed. by Angela Condello). The two philosophers present 
their perspectives on the ontology of money, which 
are different and yet interestingly intertwined. On 
the one hand, Searle returns on the crucial function 
of intentionality in the construction of social reality: 
it is intentionality that gives value to banknotes. On 
the other hand, Ferraris responds with his theory of 
documentality, that today – with bitcoins and block-
chains – must be defined as “documediality”. Money 
emerges as the paradigmatic social object, which we 
should observe as a meaningful symbol of contempo-
rary societies.
Two Questions 
on the Ontology of Money
An Imaginary Dialogue 
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Preliminary notes
When first discussing about a book on money with Maurizio Ferraris, 
and thus when first confronted with the possibility of going back to the 
basic structure of his social ontology, John Searle told me that he was 
very excited about it. And that he was excited for two main reasons. 
Firstly, because he would have one more chance to affirm his theory 
of intentionality and to try and criticize a theory constructed around 
the constitutive power of recordings, traces, and documents. In other 
words, he knew he could have one more chance to discuss – and even-
tually criticize – a philosophy which has many affinities with Jacques 
Derrida’s grammatology. Secondly, because he had never reflected on 
money, and yet he had recently got to the conclusion that the example 
of money was everywhere in his books. Every time he would mention 
the paradigmatic social object, Searle would refer to money. But never 
before two years ago had he engaged in writing an entire essay on this. 
All of us use money everyday, even if often unfamiliar with economic 
and financial theories. Yet we need philosophy in order to understand 
what money is. Maurizio Ferraris, John Searle and I are very grateful 
to Einaudi, and to Andrea Bosco, who believed in this project since the 
very beginning. Intentionality and documentality emerge, from the 
theories of these two world-leading philosophers, as complementary 
aspects of our social world. 
On March 13th 2018, Il denaro e i suoi inganni (Einaudi) was finally pub-
lished. I had the honor to translate John’s chapter, to edit the volume 
and to present my own personal perspective on their theories. Searle 
and Ferraris are undoubtedly two authorities in the field of philosophy 
both in the continental and in the analytic tradition. They have engaged 
in the field of social ontology, that is to say that branch of philosophy 
that focuses on the objects constituting reality and on our relation-
ship with them. Synthetically, their positions could be summarized as 
follows: on the one hand, Searle believes that social reality (institutions, 
professional titles, money, property, etc.) is constructed by subjects. In 
order to exist, something like a 5 dollars banknote must be represented 
and collectively recognized as valid by a sufficient amount of subjects 
within a community. Ferraris, on the other hand, claims that collective 
intentionality does not explain the complexity of the social world. In 
order to understand this world, we must look instead at documents, 
recordings where the intentionality of which Searle speaks is deposited. 
Without such a system of traces, there would be no social world. The 
double perspective (intentionality; documentality) presented in the 
book offers an interesting insight also for architectural theory, particu-
larly as far as the theory of project is concerned. The project in archi-
tecture is another paradigmatic hybrid that integrates intentions and 
traces. In some sense, this work on money suggests an innovative inter-
pretation of social reality in terms of an “intentional grammatology”. 
The ontological condition of money, as well as the ontological condition 
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of the documents of an architectural project, describes social reality as 
the product of both intentionality and documentality.
Going back to the “symbolic” social object analyzed in the book, money, 
we could say that Searle explains how it mobilizes the social world by 
creating obligations, rights and possibilities, with the same perempto-
riness of physical injunctions. On the other hand, Ferraris retraces the 
essence of money, which is recording: today, money has been reduced to 
pure bits on a computer (bitcoins) and it reveals an essence which is old-
er than the pyramids. This book presents an exemplary dialogue between 
an analytic philosopher and a continental philosopher, who are united 
by a passion for speaking clearly about concrete things.
Two questions on money (A. Condello, J. R. Searle, M. Ferraris)
Since unfortunately Searle lives on the other side of the earth, in Berke-
ley (California), I was obliged to reconstruct their dialogue through their 
texts, and by making reference to conversations the three of us had in 
different places, such as Torino, Berkeley, Paris, Rijeka, Bonn. 
Through the reconstruction of their theories as they emerge from the 
book, and additionally thanks to these occasions of exchange, I imagined 
to ask them the following questions.
Question One: why is philosophy necessary to understand what 
 money is?
Question Two: Why are the notions of “intentionality” and 
 “documentality” necessary to understand the ontology of money? 
Here is how they replied.
John Rogers Searle
When I am asked about the nature of the social object that we call money, 
I always turn towards my reflections on language. I think social ontology 
cannot say under what conditions would it be true to say that the object 
in my hand, a twenty dollar bill in this instance, is money? In order to 
answer this question we need to analyse a complex series of questions 
typical of the philosophy of ordinary language (parts of this text con-
stitute an integrated and broadened elaboration of an article that John 
Searle published on the Cambridge Journal of Economics).
You can deliberately depart from usage, but to the extent that the investi-
gation is to be philosophically relevant, it has to be anchored in ordinary 
language. Exceptions would be in very technical subjects, so if you are 
looking at the philosophical implication of superposition in quantum me-
chanics, the ordinary usage of words of like “superposition” and “quan-
tum mechanics” is likely to be of no use to you. But for such traditional 
philosophical problems of truth, causation, goodness, etc., there is no 
escaping ordinary language. 
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Also, it might seem that the nature of money is a technical problem for 
economists and that amateurs and laypersons, like myself, should not 
attempt to meddle. I think that there are probably lots of technical ques-
tions about money -- for example about how interest rates affect money 
supply and about the marginal propensity to consume -- which are far 
beyond my comprehension. However, my experience has been that a lot 
of technical sounding disciplines rest on unstated philosophical assump-
tions and it is not a bad idea for somebody to come in from outside and 
have a look. This happened to me in my dealings with Artificial Intelli-
gence where I found that many workers in artificial intelligence failed to 
understand certain fundamental distinctions between computer simula-
tions and mental processes (Searle, 1984). In any case, I am proceeding 
with my amateur’s attempt to understand the nature of money. 
It seems to me the right strategy to adopt an answer to this question 
is first to give a definition of money and then to analyze how certain 
entities can satisfy that definition and certain others cannot. The thesis 
of the article can be stated in one sentence: Money is a status function. 
In order to explain that, I have to explain what is money and what is a 
status function. Before doing that, I need to clarify certain other absolute-
ly fundamental distinctions and I will start with the nature of objectivity 
and subjectivity. 
Mountains, molecules, oceans, and galaxies have an existence which 
is independent of anyone experiencing them. They are ontologically 
objective. Pains, tickles, and itches, on the other hand, are ontologically 
subjective because they only exist insofar as they are experienced by 
human or animal subjects. One importance of this distinction is that you 
can have epistemically objective claims about a domain that is ontolog-
ically subjective. Consciousness, for example, is obviously ontologically 
subjective. Conscious states only exist insofar as they are experienced, 
but claims about consciousness made in the neurobiological science of 
consciousness can nonetheless be epistemically objective. Failure to no-
tice this fundamental point is quite common. 
Lots of entities are, on the other hand, mind dependent. Even entities 
about which we can make epistemically objective claims, like money, 
private property, government, and marriage. All of these exist only 
relative to human attitudes. They are not observer independent, they 
are observer relative or observer dependent. As far as the relation of 
these two distinctions is concerned, we should notice that all observer 
relative phenomena contain elements of ontological subjectivity because 
they only exist insofar as they are thought of, or regarded, as existing. 
Nonetheless, about many such phenomena, we can make epistemically 
objective claims. Again, where money is concerned this obviously the 
case. Money exists only insofar as something is thought to be money. Its 
existence is observer dependent. However, we can nonetheless make 
epistemically objective claims about this observer dependent domain. 
The fact that I have a twenty dollar bill in my hand is an epistemically 
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objective fact even though the fact that it is a twenty dollar bill contains 
elements of ontological subjectivity. It is only a twenty dollar bill relative 
to our attitudes. 
All observer-relative phenomena are created by conscious, or sometimes 
unconscious, mental states but the mental states that create the observer 
relative phenomena are not themselves observer relative. They have an 
existence which is, so to speak, completely intrinsic or observer inde-
pendent. The fact that this thing is money exists relative to our attitudes, 
attitudes of people like me. But the fact that I have this attitude, “I think it 
is money,” is not observer relative. That is an intrinsic fact about me. 
Maurizio Ferraris
Which came first, money or the value we attribute to it? This question 
recalls another one, which was famously asked by Plato: are things pious 
because God loves them or does God love them because they are pious? 
The answer at first seems easy: value (or at least need) precedes money. 
But maybe it is not so. Of course, when we handle money we have the 
impression that it has value because the community in which we live 
feels that it does. But it is difficult to ignore the fact that when I handle 
money, I have the impression that the value lies in the money, not in my 
head: I may have wrong theories on money, or no theory at all, without 
compromising the value of the note I am holding. This is a psychological 
and philosophical riddle to solve: if money had value because we thought 
it did, why is it not enough to change our mind for it to lose value? And if 
we are not the ones who give money its value, then who is?
This question is similar to the chicken and egg problem. So, to avoid the 
circularity and solve the dilemma, I propose to distinguish two levels. A 
manifest level, reflecting our immediate intuition, where value precedes 
money; and a deep level, which is much less intuitive, where money 
determines value instead. In what follows I will try to show the legitima-
cy of the latter. So, after presenting the manifest image, I will look into 
the deep structure by which money (a paradigmatic document) precedes 
and produces its value. This fact is manifested in the sacred respect that 
“the colour of money” (to quote an old movie) arouses in its worship-
pers – namely, us all – no matter the ethical convictions, psychological 
dispositions, ideological orientations that guide us in earning it or not, 
wanting it or not, investing it rationally or wasting it all, saving it or 
throwing it out the window. 
First, I will deal with epistemology, that is, what we know (or believe 
we know) of social reality. In other words, I will deal with the egg, 
distinguishing between the manifest image (the idea that social reality 
is constructed by intentionality, our thoughts and representations) and 
the deep structure (the idea that social reality emerges from what I call 
“documentality”: a system of recordings with recognizable forms that 
is the origin of social objects, including money). Then I will move on to 
ontology, that is, the processes underlying the formation of the value 
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and normativity of money and, more generally, of documentality. In 
other words, I will deal with the chicken, trying to account for the deep 
structure by answering the question: what makes documentality (social 
objects) possible, if intentionality is not the ultimate foundation of social 
reality? Finally, I will introduce a third dimension that, in my opinion, is 
necessary to explain the nature of money and of social reality in general: 
namely, technology. By this term I mean the actions we perform in the so-
cial world, which most of the time are not guided by clear knowledge of 
that world, and therefore appear as competence without understanding. 
The underlying idea is that – contrary to what social contract theorists 
believe – we come into contact with the ontological dimension of the 
social world – that is, with the social forces (obligation, responsibility, 
motivation, intentionality) – not through understanding (epistemology) 
but through action. When I handle money, I do not apply some economic 
theory (or at least some real economic theory: maybe I think money has 
value it because it can be traded with gold, and of course I do not won-
der why gold has value): I simply act. This attitude is the fundamental 
character of my relationship with reality in general. Then, little by little, 
through action, I might – though not necessarily will – become aware of 
what I do, so that competence becomes understanding: that is, ontology 
turns into epistemology. This is the thesis I demonstrated in my chapter 
(entitled “Il colore dei soldi”, “The colour of money”).
Conclusive remarks on the symbolic social object, between intentionality 
and documentality 
In the last and conclusive essay of the book, I trace the main aspects of 
the theories on money presented by Searle and Ferraris. It is entitled La 
cornice e l’oggetto sociale simbolico. Il denaro tra intenzionalità e doc-
umentalità (The Frame and the Symbolic Social Object Money Between 
Intentionality and Documentality). Following, some extracts from my 
chapter.
The challenge of the present book is to look at money in a different way, 
through the theories of two paradigmatic figures of the international 
philosophical landscape, John Searle and Maurizio Ferraris, addressing a 
central topic within social ontology. The task was not easy, but it has been 
accomplished. The outcome (as was to be expected from great experts in 
ontology) is that money is not exceptional compared to society, language, 
or human life in general. The frame is therefore only a metaphor of the 
symbolic system money belongs to. Money emerges from it as a tool that 
works through language while putting it into question, operates through 
social relations while defining them, and shows paradigmatically why 
and how exchange, as a fundamental social fact, works.
Searle discusses two strong theses. The first is that money is a matter of 
ordinary language. Like any form of exchange, it is a typically human 
thing, because no other animated being makes use of ordinary language 
as understood by Searle. Not only is this a system of signs and meanings 
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(which can certainly be found in many cases in the animal kingdom): it is 
also something capable of creating status functions. Social objects – like 
money – all perform certain functions, and the functions exist in rela-
tion to the fact that we have assigned some kind of intentionality to the 
objects of these categories. The existence of these objects is relative to, 
and dependent on, intentionality and the observer, whereas other objects 
have a way of life that is not relative to the observer. Mountains, trees, 
and molecules exist in a way that is not relative to the observer, while 
computers, cars, and pens exist in a way that is relative to the observer. 
The functions are always relative to the observer and are such because 
only the observer can attribute certain functions to the objects. 
The second thesis is based on the distinction between the level of 
objectivity and that of subjectivity (which Searle distinguishes into 
epistemic level, relating to knowledge, and ontological level, concerning 
existence). Money is an entity that exists only to the extent that some-
thing (ontology) is thought of as money (epistemology). The operation 
that allows for this attribution of value (epistemic level) to something 
(ontological level) can be applied to anything at all (a shell, a gold ingot, 
a can of beer, a pair of pants). And this is how the whole social reality 
is constructed: this operation, called the status function, is what makes 
it so that what is in the world (a piece of metal, a person in flesh and 
bones) is promoted to a socially relevant level by being collectively 
recognized as something relevant (a coin, a husband, a professor or a 
finance officer). Status functions are important because they attribute 
power over others. However, Searle does not explain how they attribute 
power, although he suggests that power, in his opinion, derives from 
the persistence of these functions.
Once an object is treated as a coin, it cannot stop being used that way just 
because collective intentionality shifts that value to another object, such 
as a hat. If a man is a husband, for him to cease being such it is neces-
sary to go through a long (and painful) bureaucratic procedure made of 
registers, archives, files, and signatures: in other words, it is necessary to 
go through the document system that until then has ensured the per-
sistence of that status. This is a sort of material, physical and traceable 
mark of the intention expressed on the wedding day (“I do”, in the sense 
of “I have pictured it”, “I understand it”, according to the most complete 
meaning of intentionality).
The Latin term status, in my opinion, is the first element linking the two 
philosophers: it is understood in the sense of remaining firm, sticking to 
a position and keeping balance. The intentional dimension, central to the 
thought of the American philosopher, has to be very solid for the func-
tion of money not to be ephemeral, that is, for money to be more than 
barter (a sort of peer to peer exchange, a possible ancestor of bitcoin). 
Money as a status function is created through the constitutive rule “X 
counts as Y in C”: the object X acquires the function, the exchange value 
Y, within the context C. This constitutive rule provides reasons to act and 
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conditions our desires regardless of our inclinations. 
Ferraris explains how this is possible. While acknowledging the impor-
tance of intentionality in the philosophy of money and in social ontology 
as a whole, he investigates how money is able to mobilize us (and not 
just why, as Searle does). The result is that both of these readings place 
money at the center of our society because money is a paradigm of its 
functioning: it increases our power because beyond the form of the ob-
ject (the coin, the banknote, but also more broadly the bank account, the 
bank itself, and so on up to the International Monetary Fund) there is the 
force of the object. Money is an allegory of the human bond, even though 
it exists independently from the dimension of the bond in the traditional 
legal sense. This allegory incorporates the exchange of exchanges and 
therefore, at a closer look, the whole society.
Like Searle, Ferraris also reveals something, solving some puzzles con-
cealed in what he calls the “deep structure” of social reality. Actually, in 
this case, rather than something that seems to be what it is not (deceit), 
this is something we are just not used to thinking about, or at least not 
enough. The deep structure is a system of recordings: a network of docu-
ments directly related to intentionality but, according to Ferraris, prior to 
it. Otherwise, he claims, the great financial crises of history could not be 
explained. If intentionality preceded documentality in time and impor-
tance, great depressions would have been avoided by shifting collective 
intentionality onto another object. The intermediate conclusion is that 
there must be a further system of elements in the construction of social 
reality for functions, values and status to be able to persist and have a 
recognizable value over time.
The mystical foundation of deontic power mentioned by Searle cannot be 
(only) collective intentionality. It certainly cannot be the prime founda-
tion of the value of money and of all the things that, by the virtue of their 
value, make us act. The foundation of the deontic power of money is, in 
my opinion, the transition from an object’s regular function (whatever it 
is) to its status function: The object, thanks to the status function, is reg-
istered as an object of exchange. Inscription is therefore a core in which 
the intention coincides with the trace, and only a new trace can modify 
it. The element of mysticism emerging from the idea of deontic power 
mentioned by Searle lies in identifying the origin of that power with an 
almost transcendent force: something makes us act through money, but 
it still unclear what. The element of mysticism is revealed in Ferraris’ 
theory. 
Money exists in between the two positions. This is also confirmed by 
Searle’s constant reference to the necessary representation of the status 
function, without which the function would not take place nor could per-
sist over time. Searle admits that the bank keeps a register, whose only 
physical form lies in the magnetic traces on the computer disks recording 
the amount of money one owns in the bank. Therefore, changes in the 
amount of money owned consist entirely of changes in its representation 
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on the computer disks. Without things being fixated in a representation 
(which is an inscription, a sign, a trace) and without a document system 
that organizes the exchanges, the function of money, both in use and in 
trade, could not persist.
The inscription that enables the status function and keeps it valid for 
the object-money unites two elements: the concrete material object and 
its transcendent value. That is why I think, like Simmel, that money is 
purely symbolic (Simmel, 2004: 144). The power of money is deposited in 
the relationship between individual intentionality, collective intention-
ality, and documentality: this power has a symbolic root. The intention 
to establish a status function in that object is fixated by the inscription 
and by the collective recognition of that object as money. The coin, the 
banknote, the trace on the bank account are individual instances repeat-
ed an incalculable number of times, and yet every single time they are 
more than a piece of iron, a simple piece of paper or a set of data in com-
puter memory. More precisely, a coin is both a simple piece of iron and 
the value of use and exchange that transcends it. The latter is based on 
collective intentionality and on the need for it to be fixated on repeatable 
recording systems (iteration is one of the characters on which Ferraris 
rightly insists).
These philosophical arguments consider money as a usable good, one 
that has value according to its numerical indication: it does not matter 
to have this or that banknote in your pocket, but to have one that has 
that value. In Roman law the usable goods are res quae pondere, nume-
ro, mensura consistunt: those that can be easily replaced with others, 
as they have the same quantitative and qualitative structures. Their 
fungibility, however, always falls within a genre, a group whose limit is 
defined and known. The fixation of this defining limit occurs on the dual 
level of documentality and intentionality. The ontological dimension 
intersects the epistemological one in an ambiguity that can be found in 
money and in many other objects: Ferraris rightly notes that bitcoins are 
the most concrete form of money (Simondon, 1958), as they are simple 
silicon recordings. The intangible concreteness of the bitcoin is given by 
its recognizability as a social object that is constituted as a symbolon, an 
amulet in which the individual instance coexists with the value to which 
it refers. It is a symbolic and reproducible social object, which is based 
on a document basis animated by collective intentionality.
In this symbolic foundation, money refers to the system of norms that 
hold society together: the deontic power of money and of norms cannot 
be self-founded, but needs a foundation (Zagrebelsky, 2012). Ferraris 
notes that collective intentionality is nothing more than a fiction by 
which we can say that every gesture, every decision and action, is not 
arbitrary or subjective, but belongs to a network of relationships and re-
ciprocal recognition among subjects. For this reason, once again, money 
is first and foremost a power: owning it allows one to create potential 
constraints where they do not already exist. This potential obligation to 
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others and to another collectivity, which we may call “society”, is what 
makes us act in the respect of rules and what makes us recognize a given 
object as currency and a given individual as the President of the United 
States.
The peculiarity of money is that any recording (but not any volatile ob-
ject) could be money, as Searle notes, but not all objects are used as mon-
ey, as Ferraris notes. The recording (and therefore coming into existence) 
and iteration of money have meant that it has slowly become a techni-
cally defined object, produced only in some places and in some ways; it 
can also be transferred virtually, but always through some very precise 
means. So, money is a unicum whatever, so to speak: being the outcome 
of iteration, it can be found anywhere, but is an individual bearing a 
universal and widespread value. 
Money is a symbolic social object because it is “a place of referral that 
presupposes a double layer of reality: one that lies beyond the factual 
and logical-demonstrative experience, which is, as it were, hidden behind 
a veil, and the one that the veil itself shows us, in the approximation [...] 
of disclosure and concealment’’ (Zagrebelsky, 2012: 6). Like any symbolic 
object, it is also intrinsically enigmatic and deceptive, because not every-
thing about money can be understood through perception, and because 
what intuitively seems clear may be wrong – as Searle rightly notes in his 
analytic deconstruction. In the banknote displayed by Jefferson Hayman 
and in every banknote in our wallet, there is a form (the visible one, the 
image) and a force (the invisible one, the theme or the content). For this 
dual nature, money is a symbolic social object that responsibilizes us and 
creates power. 
In his seminal work on money, which has proven able to constitute 
a total philosophy, Simmel claims that: “the unique significance [of] 
exchange [appears] as the economic-historical realization of the relativ-
ity of things [...]. No matter how closely the inner nature of an object is 
investigated, it will not reveal economic value which resides exclusively 
in the reciprocal relationship arising between several objects on the 
basis of their nature. Each of these relations conditions the other and 
reciprocates the significance which it receives from the other” (Simmel, 
2004: 99). It is a relation of reciprocity that, without simplifying them, 
brings together documentality and intentionality and now appears to 
me as it did at first: an ambitious dialogue that, for this reason, involves 
many disagreements (all well-supported) and is able to look at the overall 
complexity of a theme normally relegated to economic theory, be it ex-
planatory or radically critical. Money is thus brought back where it truly 
belongs: to the field of the theory of exchange. And therefore to the ori-
gin of human relations and of the system of social objects that surround 
us, affecting us aesthetically and intellectually. From the color of money 
to the theological matrix of the trust we have in it (Napoli, 2016).
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